Utilisateur:Serpicozaure/Bac à sable/modification Indonésie

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Le renversement de Soekarno et la période qui s'en suivit, fut une période de troubles en Indonésie de 1965 à 1966 entre les forces loyales au Président Soekarno et au Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, le parti communiste indonésien) et l'aile droite de l'armée menée par le général Abdul Haris Nasution et le major général Suharto. Sous le pretexte d'empêcher la prise de pouvoir par les communistes , Nasution and Suharto liquidèrent le PKI et renversèrent le régime de soekarno. Le rôle central, joué par Suharto dans ce processus, le mena à la présidence de l'Indonésie en 1967.

Sommaire 1 Prélude au conflit 1.1 Military split 1.2 Confrontation Indonésio-malaise 2 "G30S" et représailles 2.1 Internal military power-struggle 2.2 Retaliatory campaign 2.3 Toppling of Sukarno 3 Conséquences 3.1 Political imprisonment 3.2 Lois Anti-Chinoise 3.3 Military rule 3.4 Montée de l'islamisme 3.5 Liens ressérré avec l'occident 4 Révélations et mystères 4.1 Le PKI était-il réellement impliqué dans le G30S? 4.2 La théorie d'Anderson 4.3 Opérations psychologiques britanniques 4.4 L'aide des États-Unis à Suharto 5 Références 6 Liens Externes

[modifier] Prélude au conflit

La guerre civile indonésienne débuta deux décénnies après l'indépendance pendant lesquelles, le Président Sukarno, leader des nationalistes indonésiens, dirigea le pays. En tant que Président de la nouvelle république indépendante, Sukarno stressed socialist policies domestically et une politique extérieure résolument anti-imperialiste, underpinned by an authoritarian style of rule dependent upon his charismatic personality. These policies led him to create alliances with the Soviet bloc, People's Republic of China, and to pioneer the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement of post-colonial states à la Conference de Bandung. It also created a domestic political alliance with the Communist Party of Indonesia.

[modifier] Military split

These same policies, however, won Sukarno few friends and many enemies in the Western nations. These especially included les États-Unis d'Amérique et le Royaume-Uni, whose investors were increasingly angered by Sukarno's nationalisation of mineral, agricultural, and energy assets. In need of Indonesian allies in its Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction overlapping with the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Comintern of which it was a part.

Lorsque Sukarno rejeta l'aide alimentaire de l'USAID leading to famine conditions, the right-wing military adopted regional command structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win the loyalty of the rural population. Several officers, including Suharto, would be caught in such schemes and would be reassigned. In an attempt to curtail the right-wing military's increasing power, the Communist Party of Indonesia and the left-wing military formed a number of peasant and other mass organizations.

[modifier] Confrontation Indonésio-malaise

En 1963, une politique de Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia was announced by the Sukarno regime. This further exacerbated the split between the left-wing and right-wing military factions, with the left-wing faction and the Communist Party taking part in guerrilla raids on the border with Malaysia, while the right-wing faction largely absent from the conflict (whether by choice or orders of Sukarno is not clear).

Le conflit avec la Malaisie encouragea davantage l'Occident à chercher le moyen de renverser Sukarno, qui apparaissait comme une menace grandissante viewed as a growing threat to Southeast Asian regional stability (as with North Vietnam under the Domino Theory). The deepening of the armed conflict, coming close to all out warfare by 1965, both increased popular dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime and strengthened the hand of the right-wing generals whose forces were still close to the center of power in Jakarta.

[modifier] "G30S" et représailles

Dans les premières heures du 1er octobre 1965, une compagnie de soldats de la garde présidentielle, the Tjakrabirawa, attaqua, à Jakarta, les domiciles de septs généraux de l'armée indonésienne homes of seven of the right-wing anti-Communist generals in the Indonesian capital Jakarta.

Trois de ceux-ci furent tués immédiatement, notamment le Lieutenant Général Ahmad Yani, chef d'état major de l'armée. Trois autres généraux furent arrêtés. Le dernier officier recherché, le ministre de la défense et chef d'état major des forces armées indonésiennes,le général Abdul Haris Nasution s'échappa; sa fille, cependant, fut mortellement bléssée. Ahmad Yani's assistants were Maj-Gen S. Parman, Maj-Gen Suprapto, Maj-Gen MT Haryono, Brig-Gen Donald Isaac Panjaitan and Brig-Gen Sutoyo Siswomiharjo. The three captured generals and the bodies of the others were taken to a place known as Lubang Buaya ("la fosse aux crocodiles Hole") près de la base aérienne Halim Perdanakusumah à Jakarta. The three generals and Nasution's adjutant, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean (qui déclara être Nasution aux soldats venus le chercher et aurait permis de ce fait à Nasution de leur échapper), furent par la suite, exécutés et leurs corps all the bodies were thrown down a well.

Les membres de la garde présidentielle s'emparèrent également de la radio nationale ( RRI ) et du batiment des télécommunications dans le centre de Jakarta. depuis les locaux de la radio nationale, ils diffusèrent un communiqué, dans lequel ils se présentaient sous le nom de "Mouvement du 30 Septembre" (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, abbrégé G30S ) led by Lieut-Col Untung bin Syamsuri. ils déclarèrent avoir arrêté plusieurs généraux, membres d'une conspiration, le "Conseil des Généraux", qui avait fomenté un coup d'état contre le gouvernement du président Soekarno. ils déclarèrent plus tard que cette action devait avoir lieu lors de la "journée de l'armée" (le 5 octobre) avec le soutien de la CIA, and that the Council would then install themselves as a military junta.

Furthermore, the soldiers proclaimed the establishment of a "Revolutionary Council" consisting of various well-known military officers and civilian leaders that would be the highest authority in Indonesia. Additionally, they declared President Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet as invalid ("demisioner").

According to one chief conspirator Lieut-Col Latief, the Palace Guards had not attempted to kill or capture Major General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD (Komando Strategi dan Cadangan TNI Angkatan Darat - the Army Stategic and Reserves Command), because he was considered as a Sukarno-loyalist and an apolitical general. Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, made the counter-allegation that the G30S is a rebellious movement that sought to replace President Sukarno's government with a Communist government. Upon hearing of the radio announcement, Suharto and Nasution began consolidating their forces, successfully gaining the loyalty of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj-Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the commander of army special forces RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat).

During the evening of October 1, RPKAD soldiers recaptured RRI and Telecommunications Building without any resistance as the rebel soldiers had retreated back to Halim Base. RPKAD forces proceeded to attack Halim Perdanakusumah AF Base on the morning of October 2, but was stopped by the rebel soldiers in a fierce gunbattle in which several fatalities were inflicted on both sides. A direct order from President Sukarno managed to secure the surrender of the rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suhartoist forces occupied the base. The next day, soldiers discovered the buried remains of the kidnapped generals. The corpses were exhumed, displayed to the press, and buried in a sombre ceremony on October 5, 1965.

[modifier] Internal military power-struggle

After the assassinations of those generals, the highest ranking officer in the Indonesian military, and third highest in the overall chain-of-command, was Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of the right-wing camp. However, le 5 octobre Sukarno moved to promote Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudra, considered a Sukarno-loyalist, to Army Chief-of-Staff.

After the promotion, the New York Times reported that an unnamed Western "diplomatic report" alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto's alleged communism, as well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their grip on power. (New York Times, 6 octobre, 1965)

In the aftermath of the assassinations, however, Major Gen. Suharto and his KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserves) units were closest to Jakarta. By default, Suharto became the field general in charge of prosecution of the G30S. Later, at the insistence of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Pranoto was removed and Suharto was promoted to Army Chief-of-Staff le 14 octobre, 1965. (New York Times, 15 octobre, 1965)

[modifier] Retaliatory campaign

The installation of Suharto as Army Chief-of-Staff established the right-wing faction's dominance of the Indonesian Army's command. In addition to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), this faction was also hostile toward Sukarno-loyalists, and the Chinese (both Chinese Indonesians as well as expatriates from the People's Republic of China).

Le 18 octobre, une déclaration was read over the army-controlled radio stations, interdisant le PKI. L'interdiction concernait le parti en lui-même, The ban included the party itself, and its youth and women's wings, peasant associations, intellectual and student groups, et le syndicat SOBSI. At the time, it was not clear whether this ban applied only to Jakarta (by then controlled by the Army), or the whole Republic of Indonesia. However, the ban was soon used as a pretext for the Indonesian Army to go throughout the country carrying out extrajudicial punishments, including mass arrest and summary executions, against suspected leftists and Sukarno loyalists.

The Army, acting on orders by Suharto and supervised by Nasution, began a campaign of agitation and incitement to violence among Indonesian civilians aimed not only at Communists but the ethnic-Chinese community and toward President Sukarno himself. The regime was quickly destabilised, with the Army the only force left to maintain order. (New York Times, 19 octobre, 1965)

[modifier] Toppling of Sukarno

As Communists were driven out of government in the months afterward, the troika of Pres. Sukarno, Nasution, and Suharto jockeyed for power. Contemporary reports state that Sukarno was politically weak and desperate to keep power in the hands of his presidency by starting a factional struggle between Gen. Nasution and Suharto, as the two were absorbed in personal ambitions.

General Nasution was believed to have launched his own bid for power on 16 décembre, 1965, when he won appointment to the Supreme Operations Command, and gained a grip over the traditionally civilian-held portion of the military hierarchy. It was reported that Nasution would have preferred forming a military junta to replace Sukarno. (New York Times, December 16, 1965.)

Cependant, le 1er février, 1966, le Président Soekarno promu Suharto au grade de Lieutenant Général. Le même mois, le Général Nasution had been forced out of his position of Defense Minister. By March, Suharto would begin the process of taking power for himself. (New York Times, 22 Février, 1966)

[modifier] Conséquences

For more details on this topic, see New Order (Indonesia)

After being promoted, Suharto was assigned emergency powers le 11 mars, 1966 through a presidential decree by Sukarno known as the Supersemar. He would then go on to become president in 1967. Due to Suharto-era censorship and propaganda under his New Order government, the true numbers and ennumeration of casualties from the Civil War are heavily disputed. The estimates of the death toll of the conflict range from over 100,000 to 1.5 million. Other effects of the Indonesian Civil War, however, can be understood in the light of greater press freedom in the post-Suharto era.

[modifier] Political imprisonment

It is known that with Suharto's rise, les membres du parti communiste indonésien survivants furent surnommés tapol (contraction de tahanan politik ou "prisonnier politique"). During Suharto's reign, les tapol se virent infligés de lourdes peines de prison sans procès , leurs propriétés saisies ou détruites. Les épouses, enfants et la famille de tapol were subjected to guilt by association. être désignés comme tapol signifiait a permanent outcast status in Indonesian society, even after completion of a sentence; tapol have sued in modern times for restitution of their right to the franchise and for compensation for their losses.

Possible prison sentences included internal exil dans des colonies pénitentiaires situées sur des îles désolées de l'archipel indonésien, comme l'île de Buru aux Moluques. Among its more famous prisoners included author and PEN Freedom to Write winner Pramoedya Ananta Toer, qui fût incarcérer pour appartenance supposée à un groupe littéraire du parti communiste, le LEKRA. In a book of memoirs (The Mute's Soliloquy), Pramoedya made detailed allegations de travail forcé, famine, torture et autres abus within the colony. (Inside Indonesia, Avril-Juin 1999)

[modifier] Lois Anti-Chinoise

For more detail on this topic, see Chinese Indonesian and Anti-Chinese legislation in Indonesia

While resentment toward Chinese Indonesians by Malay-descended peoples of the archipelago dated back to the Dutch East Indies era, persisting through the Post-Independence era, the Indonesian Civil War unleashed both widescale violence and a new tide of anti-Chinese legislation throughout the archipelago. Stereotypes of the Chinese as disproportionately affluent and greedy were common throughout the time (en Indonésie comme en Malaisie), mais avec l'hystérie anti-communiste, l'association des indonésiens d'origine chinoise avec la République populaire de chine les présentait comme une cinquième colonne communiste.

As a result of this hysteria, Indonesia's hitherto friendly diplomatic relations with mainland China were severed et l'ambassade de Chine à Jakarta fut incendiée by a mob. Several anti-Chinese laws were passed to curtail Chinese culture and civil rights, y compris des lois interdisant l'utilsation de l'alphabet chinois on shops et autres batiments and other buildings and mandating closure of Chinese language schools, adoption of "Indonesian" sounding names, and severe limits on Buddhist temple construction. The lasting effects of these laws and anti-Chinese sentiment fostered by the Suharto regime was demonstrated in the organization of anti-Chinese pogroms in 1998.

[modifier] Military rule

The liquidation and banning of the Communist Party eliminated one of the largest political parties in Indonesia. It had placed third in a 1955 election. It was also among the largest Communist Parties in the Comintern, at an estimated 3 million members. Along with the subsequent efforts by Suharto to wrest power from Sukarno by purging loyalists from the parliament, civilian government in Indonesia was effectively put to an end by the civil war.

In the place of civilian rule, a new system of military rule took hold, based on set-aside seats in the Parliament as well as the dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine of the military, in taking the roles of both soldiers and administrators. The political parties not banned outright were consolidated into a single party, the Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), more commonly known as Golkar. Though Suharto would later allow for the formation of two non-Golkar parties, these were kept weak during his regime.

[modifier] Montée de l'islamisme

The purging of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the Communists, had a notable side effect of having given greater space for the development of Islamism in Indonesia. This included liberal, conservative, and extremist groups practicing Islam in Indonesia. It widely believed by observers of Indonesian history and politics that Suharto's forces whipped up anti-Communist sentiment in part by exploiting conservative Muslims' fears of "godless" Communism to instigate a jihad against them during the civil war.

As for more mainstream groups, conservative Islamic groups (called the "Central Axis") became a prop of the regime for some time after the civil war. Liberal Islamic groups, on the other hand, are believed to have defected during the wave of protests before the Indonesian Revolution of 1998.

[modifier] Liens ressérré avec l'occident

Le changement de régime de Soekarno à Suharto, bien que brutal, brought a shift in policy that allowed for USAID and other relief agencies to operate within the country. Suharto would open Indonesia's economy by divesting state owned companies, et les investisseurs occidentaux en particulier furent encouragé and Western nations in particular were encouraged to invest and take control of many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia. The result was the alleviation of absolute poverty and famine conditions due to shortfalls in rice supply and Sukarno's reluctance to take Western aid, and stabilisation of the economy.

As a result of his victory in the civil war, Suharto would come to be seen as a pro-Western and anti-Communist strongman regime, similar to that of Augusto Pinochet. An ongoing military and diplomatic relationship between the Indonesia and the Western powers was cemented, leading to American, British, and Australian arms sales and training of military personnel.

[modifier] Révélations et mystères

Qautre décénnies plus tard, des questions demeurent about the veracity of accounts of the events both leading up to and during the war provided by the Western governments and by Suharto. The ousting of the Suharto regime and beginning of the Reformation period in Indonesia and the end of the Cold War for the Western governments has allowed greater freedom of information, leading to a significant process of historical revisionism as well as the formation of conspiracy theories around the Indonesian Civil War. Still, mysteries remain over the time period.

[modifier] Le PKI était-il réellement impliqué dans le G30S?

Supporters of Suharto claim that his actions as field general were justified due to the imminent threat of a PKI-led coup to seize power, as had been attempted in 1948. Several critics of Suharto note, however, that the PKI in 1965 had an inclination that was similar to Eurocommunism and had come to prefer parliamentary electoral politics to armed insurrection; in fact, the PKI placed third in a 1955 presidential election, behind Sukarno's own Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and the Islamist party Masyumi.

These critics allege that Suharto purposefully exaggerated PKI involvement in the assassinations of the generals (both during the war and in subsequent propaganda events held on the anniversary) as mere window dressing for what was his own ruthless quest for power. The critics commonly point out that Suharto had already been involved in a 1959 corruption scandal involving sugar smuggling in the Bandung area, and that since the 1990s post-Cold War period that Suharto's regime was known for both dishonesty and brutality.

Ils existe un certains nombre de théorie à propos de l'implication du PKI dans le mouvement du G30S. Les voici:

• Le responsable du G30S était le PKI

Le PKI provoqua un coup d'état contre l'Armée indonésienne et le gouvernement pour installer un régime communiste en Indonésie.

• Le G30S fut un problème interne à l'armée

An army clique led by Suharto launched the coup precisely by sneaking into the PKI

• Le G30S fut organisé par la CIA

The CIA worked together with an army clique to destroy the PKI. The aim of CIA in Indonesia at that time was clearly to destroy communism in Southeast Asia.

• The G30S was a Meeting Point between American and British Interests

The interests of Britain which wanted Sukarno's confrontation against Malaysia to end with him losing power and the USA's interest of ridding the world of communism sparked the G30S.

• Sukarno fut le cerveau du G30S

One of the most controversial theories of the G30S, Sukarno wanted to make the top army officials 'vanish' because they threatened his power. The PKI was also pulled into the mess because of its closeness with Sukarno.

• La théorie du chaos

Nobody actually did the G30S. There was no grand scenario and it was ultimately affected by field operations.The G30S was a mix of Western nations, the doings of the PKI's leaders and the army's corrupt cliques.

Further muddling matters are recriminations of coup plots by both the left-wing and right-wing. As mentioned before, the PKI had in fact launched a coup effort in 1948; lesser known is that the right-wing military faction had already made several attempts on Sukarno's life.

[modifier] La théorie d'Anderson

The allegations by the G30S assassins, that they acted to stop a coup by the right-wing Council of Generals and to take power, have always been dismissed by Suharto supporters as absurd. These Suharto supporters state that there was no such Council of Generals and that the G30S was merely a communist coup for whom the assassination of the generals was a prelude to the overthrow of Sukarno.

Recent historical revisionism by a leading American expert on Indonesia, Professor emeritus Benedict Anderson of Cornell University, refutes this quick dismissal. Anderson has put forward a theory that the Civil War was almost totally an internal matter of a divided military with the PKI playing only a peripheral role; that the right-wing generals assassinated on 1 October 1965 were, in fact, the Council of Generals coup planning to assassinate Sukarno and install themselves as a military junta; and that G30S was in fact a movement of officers loyal to Sukarno who carried out their plan believing it would preserve, not overthrow, Sukarno's rule. The boldest claim in the Anderson theory, however, is that Suharto was in fact privy to the G30S assassination plot.

Central to the Anderson theory is an examination of a little-known figure in the Indonesian army, Colonel Abdul Latief. Latief had spent a career in the Army, and according to Anderson had been both a staunch Sukarno loyalist and a friend with Suharto. In the civil war, however, he was jailed and named a conspirator in G30S, and given a military trial in the 1970s. At his trial, Latief made the accusation that Suharto himself had been a co-conspirator in the G30S plot, and had betrayed the group for his own purposes.

Anderson points out that Suharto himself has twice admitted to meeting Latief in a hospital on 30 September 1965, the namesake of G30S, and that his two narratives of the meeting are contradictory. In an interview with American journalist Arnold Brackman, Suharto stated that Latief had been there merely "to check" on him, as his son was receiving care for a burn. In a later interview with Der Spiegel, Suharto stated that Latief had gone to the hospital in an attempt on his life, but had lost his nerve. Anderson believes that in the first account, Suharto was simply being disingenuous; in the second, that he had lied.

Further backing his claim, Anderson cites circumstantial evidence that Suharto was indeed in on the plot. Among these are:

• That almost all the key military participants named a part of G30S were, either at the time of the assassinations or just previously, close subordinates of Suharto: Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, Colonel Latief, and Brigadier-General Supardjo in Jakarta, and Colonel Suherman, Major Usman, and their associates at the Diponegoro Division’s HQ in Semarang.
• That in the case of Untung and Latief, their association with Suharto was so close that attended each others' family events and celebrated their sons' rites of passage together.
• That the two generals who had direct command of all troops in Jakarta (save for the Presidential Guard, who carried out the assassinations) were Suharto and Jakarta Military Territory Commander Umar. Neither of these figures were assassinated, and (if Anderson's theory that Suharto lied about an attempt on his life by Latief) no attempt even made.
• That during the time period that the assassination plot had been made, Suharto (as commander of the Kostrad) had made a habit of acting in a duplicitous manner: while Suharto was privy to command decisions in Confrontation, the intelligence chief of his unit Ali Murtopo had been making connections and providing information to the hostile governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Royaume-Uni, and the United States through an espionage operation run by Benny Murdani in Thailand. Murdani later became a spy chief in Suharto's government.

Anderson's theory, for all the exhaustive research it has entailed, still leaves open a number of questions of interpretation. If, as Anderson believes, Suharto did have inside knowledge of the G30S plot, this still leaves open several possibilities: that Suharto had truly taken part in the plot and defected; that he had been acting as a spy for the Council of Generals; or that he was disinterested completely in the factional struggle of G30S and Council of Generals. Given that Suharto is infirm, reclusive, and judged as senile by the Indonesian judicial system, the questions raised by the Anderson speculation may never receive an answer from the man himself.

[modifier] Opérations psychologiques britanniques

The role of the Royaume-Uni's Foreign Office and MI6 intelligence service has also come to light, in a series of exposés by Paul Lashmar and Oliver James in The Independent newspaper beginning in 1997. These revelations have also come to light in journals on military and intelligence history.

The revelations included an anonymous Foreign Office source stating that the decision to unseat Pres. Sukarno was made by Prime Minister Harold MacMillan then executed under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. According to the exposés, le Royaume-Uni had already become alarmed with the announcement of the Konfrontasi policy. It has been claimed that a CIA memorandum of 1962 indicated that Prime Minister Macmillan and President John F. Kennedy were increasingly alarmed by the possibility of the Confrontation with Malaysia spreading, and agreed to "liquidate President Sukarno, depending on the situation and available opportunities." However, the documentary evidence does not support this claim.

To weaken the regime, the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) coordinated psychological operations in concert with the British military, to spread black propaganda casting the PKI, Chinese Indonesians, and Sukarno in a bad light. These efforts were to duplicate the successes of British Psyop campaign in the Malayan Emergency.

Of note, these efforts were coordinated from a British embassy in Singapore where the British Broadcasting Service (BBC), Associated Press (AP), and New York Times filed their reports on the Indonesian Civil War. According to Roland Challis, the BBC correspondent who was in Singapore at the time, journalists were open to manipulation by IRD due to Sukarno's stubborn refusal to allow them into the country: "In a curious way, by keeping correspondents out of the country Sukarno made them the victims of official channels, because almost the only information you could get was from the British ambassador in Jakarta."

These manipulations included the BBC reporting that Communists were planning to slaughter the citizens of Jakarta. The accusation was based solely on a forgery planted by Norman Reddaway, a propaganda expert with the IRD. He later who bragged in a letter to the British ambassador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist that it "went all over the world and back again," and was "put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC." Sir Andrew Gilchrist himself informed the Foreign Office on 5 October 1965: "I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change."

In the April 16, 2000 Independent, Sir Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the war, confirmed that the IRD was active during this time. He officially denied any role by MI6, and denied "personal knowledge" of the British arming the right-wing faction of the Army, though he did comment that if there were such a plan, he "would certainly have supported it."

Although the British MI6 is strongly implicated in this scheme by the use of the Information Research Department (seen as an MI6 office), any role by MI6 itself is officially denied by the UK government, and papers relating to it have yet to be declassified by the Cabinet Office. (The Independent, December 6, 2000)

[modifier] L'aide des États-Unis à Suharto

Souvent cité par la gauche comme preuve d'un complot plus large, de portée internationale, visant à destituer Soekarno, un certain nombre de révélations ont été faites par d'anciens fonctionnaires du Département d'état et de la CIA concernant les actions américaines durant la guerre civile indonésienne.

au début de 1990, des diplomates Étatsuniens révélèrent au Washington Post and other media outlets qu'ils avaient établi des listes d"agents communistes" indonésiens qui comportaient jusqu'à 5000 noms et qui furent remisent aux militaires et agents de renseignements loyales à Suharto. La journaliste Étatsunienne Kathy Kadane revealed the extent of the secret American support of some of the massacres of 1965-66 that allowed Suharto to seize the Presidency. She interviewed many former US officials and CIA members, who spoke of compiled lists of PKI operatives, which the Americans ticked off as the victims were killed or captured. They worked closely with the British who were keen to protect their interests in Malaysia. Sir Andrew Gilchrist cabled the Foreign Office in London saying: "…a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change". The PKI had won some popular support from the poor, it was this popularity, rather than any armed insurgency that alarmed the American government. Like Vietnam in the North, Indonesia might 'go communist'.(San Francisco Examiner May 20, 1990)

En 2001, the National Security Archive at George Washington University obtained several internal documents of the U.S. Department of State, bolstering the ambassadors' claims of American collaboration with Suharto. However, the National Security Archive claims that communications between Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have been heavily redacted.

[modifier] Références

• Anderson, Benedict. "Petrus Dadi Ratu" New Left Review. Mai-Juin 2000
• "Army in Jakarta Imposes a Ban on Communists." New York Times. 19 octobre 1965
• Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, Black Rose, 1998, pp. 193-198 ISBN 1-56751-052-3
• CIA Stalling State Department Histories, The National Security Archive. Consulté le May 23
• Easter, David. '"Keep the Indonesian pot boiling': western covert intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966', Cold War History, Vol 5, No 1, février 2005.
• "Jakarta Cabinet Faces Challenge." New York Times 16 décembre 1965
• "Jakarta Leftist Out As Army Chief." New York Times 15 octobre 1965
• Lashmar, Paul and Oliver, James. "MI6 Spread Lies To Put Killer In Power" The Independent. (16 avril 2000)
• Lashmar, Paul and Oliver, James. "How we destroyed Sukarno" The Independent. (6 décembre 2000)
• {{{title}}}. ISBN 0-7509-1668-0. 
• "Sukarno Removes His Defense Chief" New York Times. 22 février, 1966
• "Sukarno Seen Behind Coup" New York Times. 6 octobre 1965
• Tapol Troubles: When Will They End?, Inside Indonesia, April-June 1999.
• {{{title}}}. ISBN 0-14-028904-6. 

[modifier] Liens Externes

• Shadow Play - Website accompanying a 2002 PBS documentary on Indonesia, with emphasis on the Suharto-era and the transition from New Order to Reformation.
• Tiger Tales: Indonesia - Website accompanying a 2002 BBC World Service radio documentary on Indonesia, focusing on early Suharto era. Features interviews with Indonesian generals and victims of the regime. Program is available in streaming RealAudio format.

Category:History of Indonesia
Category:Civil wars
Category:Cold War